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Agency (WDA) to attract inward investment in manufacturing. While initially successful in meeting the need for jobs, it was a strategy that became increasingly unsustainable in the face of rapid globalisation (MAINWARING, 1995) . A shift in emphasis became apparent in 1994 when Wales was selected as one of the regions to pilot the EU's Regional Technology Plan (RTP) and, since the establishment of the devolved National
Assembly for Wales (NAW) in 1999, the Welsh Assembly Government (WAG) has adopted -in principle, at least -the aim of developing Wales as a 'knowledge economy'.
The Technium project, which emerged in south west Wales as an attempt to strengthen the interface between higher education and business, has become a key component in the new strategy.
In this paper, we argue that Technium provides a valuable case study and potentially replicable innovation model (or component of such a model) for relatively disadvantaged regions. The project has been subject to criticism (COOKE and CLIFTON, 2005) but we believe that in key respects the critics have projected an Sciences and an Institute of Advanced Telecommunications, which have occurred at a sub-regional (i.e., sub-Wales) level and which may be characterised as signalling the emergence of a local or sub-regional innovation system (IS). The next section provides a brief overview of the literature on territorial innovation systems and the policy insights it has generated. The following sections put matters in a more localised context with a sketch of the recent evolution of policy-making in Wales and a description of the preTechnium research base in south west Wales. We then explain what Technium is and describe the architecture of the system of which it is part. That is followed by a provisional (and necessarily partial) assessment of the costs and benefits. We consider the extent to which these developments constitute a distinct approach to creating a local IS, before concluding.
TERRITORIAL INNOVATION SYSTEMS
The notion that the innovation process in the modern economy is best understood in systemic terms seems to have originated with FREEMAN (1987) and was developed through the 1990s by LUNDVALL (1992) , NELSON (1993) , CARLSSON (1995) and FREEMAN (1995) himself, among others. It marked a shift away from the idea that innovation is an act occurring within a firm or other agent in isolation from the broader cultural and institutional context. Innovation was believed to be more effective where there is a rich mix of formal institutions (firms, universities, technical colleges, training agencies, government advisory agencies, etc.), operating within a supportive legal and policy framework, plus a rich mix of informal institutions, from close personal relationships involving trust (MASKELL and MALMBERG, 1999) , through industry clusters promoting Marshallian external economies (PORTER, 1990; BAPTISTA and SWANN, 1998) , to localised networks and broad innovation-conducive milieu (CAMAGNI, 1991) .
The IS concept was initially thought out in terms of nation states and, in that respect, is territorially constrained despite the obvious trend towards globalization. It has survived this trend because globalization and localization are now broadly accepted as complementary processes (CANTWELL, 1995; CARLSSON, 2006) , the diversity of local systems allowing each to find a niche in the global economy and for multinational firms to tap into local expertise. The concept is not, however, spatially defined of necessity and some have argued for its applicability to technologies (CARLSSON, 1994) and sectors (MALERBA, 2002) . It is probably best to think of the spatial, technological and sectoral dimensions as interacting in complex ways and, in relation to Technium, we shall see that, while the spatial aspect is dominant, the others are also relevant.
Because there may be sub-national differences in the mix of institutions and economic structures it follows that ISs could be identifiable at smaller territorial levels.
Indeed, one might imagine a series of systems of increasing locality nested one within the other. What are likely to give the more localised versions their identity are the informal institutions: trust-based relationships, for example, tend to be promoted by proximity (MASKELL and MALMBERG, 1999; MORGAN, 2004) ; networks function more effectively when people meet regularly; labour mobility and idea spillovers occur in If one seeks the distinctive components of an IS in a set of formal and informal institutions then, clearly, the degree of institutional development, or 'institutional thickness' (AMIN and THRIFT, 1995) , has a role to play in the system's success. But while institutional development is generally regarded as a positive sign, institutional ossification, or lock-in, can have a stultifying effect, something which appears to be more problematic in old industrial areas (GRABHER, 1993; HUDSON, 1994; MORGAN and NAUWELAERS, 2002) . Within the Welsh context, for example, HENDERSON (2000) concluded that the RTP may not have filled early hopes because of 'well-entrenched interests and responsibilities'.
All this implies that IS designs that are appropriate for one region may not be for
another. There may be best-practice regions but not necessarily best-practice systems (HUDSON et al., 1997; NEUWELAERS and WINTJES, 2003; TODTLING and TRIPPL, 2005) . Even so, a number of positive features appear to be common to a wide set of regions displaying successful collective learning (KEEBLE and WILKINSON, 1999 , for an editorial summary of case studies in the special issue of Regional Studies).
A checklist of desirable characteristics suggested by these case studies include:
• the creation of strong local knowledge networks, proximity being important for such desirable traits as 'imitation, emulation and reverse engineering'
• the exploitation of the multi-disciplinary culture of a university • large corporations seeking to externalise part of their R&D functions to SMEs that can act as intermediaries with universities
• the importance of developing extra-regional links
• the importance of producing highly qualified workers to support the labour market.
To these, one might add:
• the avoidance of top-down modes of intervention in favour of an interactive and facilitative role on the part of government and its agencies (NEUWELAERS and MORGAN, 1999) • the avoidance of entrenched cultural attitudes (GRABHER, 1993) In the context of old industrial areas, TODTLING and TRIPPL (2005) see the key issues as: strengthening higher-education institutions (HEIs) and their links to business; embedding foreign firms in order to acquire complementary knowledge and compensate for the low knowledge-absorption capacity of the region; and overcoming locked-in behaviour.
Wales appears to have been fertile ground for IS analysts and advocates and provided an early example of its application at a regional level (REES and MORGAN, 1991; COOKE, 1992) . This is attributable to its distinctive political culture and 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 
ECONOMIC POLICY DEVELOPMENT IN WALES
Throughout the 1990s, the WDA gradually shifted emphasis away from the 'advance factory -subsidy' approach to attracting investment and towards a more collaborative business-support regime encompassing indigenous SMEs. Considerable effort was put into embedding foreign multinationals into supply chains into which domestic companies were insinuated. The quality disciplines and, in many instances, the Japanese-style industrial practices, imposed on these firms were seen by the Agency as the way to create a domestic innovation culture. The most successful and multi-tiered supply chains developed in the automotive parts industry, which has become a well recognised cluster, and, to a lesser extent, in the more diffuse electronics sector (COOKE, 2004) . According to MORGAN (1997) , these strong public-private collaborative arrangements were instrumental in Wales' invitation to participate in the RTP. That programme, itself, represented a switch in the EU's innovation policy away from a technology-driven model to one emphasising the social, institutional and commercial aspects of innovation (i.e., a recognition of the systemic nature of innovation). Despite the policy adaptations within Wales, as late as 1998, the Welsh Affairs Committee of the House of Commons (WAC, 1998) voiced concern about the slow rate of change in WDA philosophy away from its preoccupation with inward investment. This was a clear suggestion that the Agency, or some parts of it, remained locked into the old 'build it and fill it' mentality. rather than a sector-based approach to the delivery of economic development'. However, south west Wales is a far from homogeneous space, being highly urbanised in the east (around Swansea Bay) and rural to the west (Carmarthenshire and Pembrokeshire) and these differences are respected in the Spatial Plan. In particular, the HEI-based innovation approach is not only constrained by the existing distribution of HEIs but is initially more appropriate for areas of higher urban density and, therefore, of knowledgeabsorbing potential (and which in Wales as a whole means Cardiff, Swansea and north east Wales). Taken together with eligibility for Objective-1 funding, this leaves Swansea as the obvious location to experiment in and nurture an innovation system that can subsequently reach out to the more rural areas to the west and to other parts of Wales. Given this historical legacy, the Technium project was designed to do five things:
improve the knowledge flow from the University into the private sector; help spin out a local population of SMEs with a strong research ethos; use the potential for University links to attract (spin in) non-local research-driven young firms; promote the retention of graduates in the area; and encourage large, established firms to devolve part of their R&D functions to Technium and so develop fruitful links to the University and to Techniumbased SMEs. As is obvious from our description of the inherited research base, an ambitious programme of this nature would be unsupportable without a significant WHAT IS TECHNIUM?
The Technium project began as a partnership between Swansea University and the WDA and has, so far, had its greatest impact in south west Wales -what might, in HE terms, be thought of as the natural hinterland of Swansea University. 4 It is also within this region Techniums, the active and close involvement of Swansea University in the south west group and their incorporation in broader systemic developments, sets these seven apart.
They will be the focus of the remaining discussion.
[ Figure 1 about here] redevelopment. As we shall explain below, Technium has been instrumental in bringing forward this programme of urban renewal.) Because of pent-up demand, the 14 units filled up quickly and the pressing need then was to get firms out rather than in. The objective has been an initial incubation stage of two-three years for university spin-outs Technologies and it will, in future, provide a destination for spin-outs from the new IAT. T-1 remains the hub of the Technium network, housing the IT infrastructure that connects to the University and, from there into the UK HEI 'SuperJanet' network.
However, each individual facility also has on-site business support. All Technium tenants will be able to use PLM software (though not all with on-site access). Fig. 2 is a schematic representation of the broader system of which Technium is part. The key players are the University, the WDA, the local authorities and private companies.
[ Figure 2 about here]
The Technium philosophy is that new firms should be able to stand on their own feet after two-three years of intensive incubation support. During that time they not only have favourable access to knowledge and technology networks and business support, but they also have the opportunity of sharing information with each other and thus establishing informal networks that can continue when they move on. It is too early to assess the extent to which such self-supporting behaviour has developed, but the fact that T-2 tenants are co-funding their own grow-on space is a positive sign. Even when they have left, these firms (and any others that satisfy the criteria) have the opportunity to be 
COSTS AND BENEFITS
Raising the capital costs of these developments has been facilitated by the operation of EU Structural Funds. To access these funds, project proposers have had to generate £-for-£ match funding. This has come from University overheads and staff time, land (from the WDA, local authorities and the University) and public-sector grants. Over a quarter of the funding has come from the private sector. For the first six Techniums (1, 2, Digital, PE, ST and Pembs), the public/private capital/revenue breakdown is shown in Table 2 . The long-term sustainability of the project depends on rental incomes, service charges and associate membership subscriptions. The rentals are levied at commercial rates, commensurate with the quality of the buildings, and will sustain the project (i.e., pay for maintenance and depreciation) provided that the occupancy rates are adequate.
[ Table 2 about here] Success in maintaining high occupancy is therefore critical to long-term viability.
This has been seized on by COOKE and CLIFTON (2005) There is also the direct involvement by private-sector service suppliers already noted.
What if Technium were to fail? What would be the impact on public funds? It can be seen from Table 2 that public-sector capital and revenue expenditure has been £38.9 million. Of this, half has come from EU structural funds. A proper evaluation of the project would require comparison with other projects which competed for equivalent funds but failed to get them. If Technium was not at the expense of any demonstrably superior project, it cannot be said (from the perspective of WAG) that these funds were poorly invested. Unfortunately, we do not have information on which to make that judgement. The remaining public contribution, in the form of university overheads and development land, arguably also has an opportunity cost below its nominal value (overheads, in principle, having zero marginal cost). Even if these considerations are development 'has attracted a great deal of private sector interest following public sector investment'. The public-sector investment referred to here is T-1 and T-2. It appears that these Technium projects have created the conditions for a healthy commercial property market, from which they will benefit themselves. Of course, it remains to be seen whether something similar will happen to the other off-campus buildings. In the absence of any clear knowledge of the residual capital values, it seems sensible to use building cost as a proxy. Assuming the public-sector share of the residual capital is equal to its share of the capital cost, then that implies subtracting £32.3 million from the total public investment to yield an estimate of public sunk cost, i.e., the £6.6 million public revenue expenditure.
The public investment has, in turn, helped lever £13.1 million from the private sector. Of course the systemic costs, involving the ILS and the IAT are greater. But although these are important constituents of the system architecture, they are independently conceived on the basis of their own projected internal returns. The system is more than the sum of its parts and the system returns, mostly in the form of dynamic externalities over a long period, will be greater than the returns to any one component.
Thus, even assuming that the public contribution to Technium has an opportunity cost This may be a relatively small sum to risk on a project that could transform the local economy, but are there any signs that Technium will actually succeed? Any evaluation is necessarily provisional since the programme is still being rolled out. The established facilities, at the time of writing T-1, T-2, T-Digital and T-Digital at Sony, are 77 per cent occupied and are host to around 300 jobs, nearly all graduates; see Table 1 .
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(A degree of spare capacity is actually desirable to accommodate the turnover of occupants.) T-SS was the latest to open and is presently home to two tenants; the projection is for full occupancy over three years. In one respect, perhaps not anticipated, the project has already had a visible impact -on the Swansea waterfront redevelopment.
This was scheduled to occur anyway, but there seems little doubt that the Technium developments have been instrumental in bringing the scheme forward by several years.
The waterfront example illustrates the fact that the benefits of a system component accrue to the whole system and are, therefore, to a substantial extent external to the component itself. An evaluation of Technium benefits based solely on jobs created, or of value added by businesses located there, or by the value of Technium assets, will inevitably miss a large part of the gains to the local economy. These will take the form of network externalities that will reach into the economy once firms graduate from the project, knowledge spillovers operating within supply chains of which Technium firms are part, higher land values, and the multiplier effects associated with greater local value added. It was noted earlier that low Welsh GDP is at least partly a consequence of an employment structure skewed towards low-paid jobs, and this has 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 Just as a regional IS shares many of the features of its parent national IS, so the emerging sub-regional system in south west Wales is still substantially embedded within the Welsh system. The developments described above were, however, stimulated and facilitated by characteristics which, though not necessarily unique individually, collectively help to shape the emerging local system. First, the structural weaknesses of the economy and relative deprivation call for a more overtly interventionist approach (if only in terms of funding), as compared to more dynamic and self-sufficient metropolitan regions (including, in this purely relative sense, south east Wales). Second, is the actual fact of opportunities arising from west Wales' eligibility for the highest level of EU Structural funds over a prolonged period. Third, are the particular industrial strengths of the subregion in performance engineering, electronics and energy. Fourth are the particular strengths of the University in engineering, computing and, increasingly, life sciences.
Fifth is the overall weakness of the pre-existing research base, both within but more especially outside the university. And finally, there is the spatial organization of governance, allowing key agencies such as the WDA/WAG an element of local distinctiveness in approach. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 greater opportunities for graduates to work locally. At the highest levels of educational attainment, it is the demand for skills that is weak, rather than the supply, with the result graduates leave the area to look for opportunities elsewhere. Retention of graduates is itself one of the necessary steps to creating a robust innovative milieu.
Many of the case studies in the literature deal with dynamic regions focused on equally successful universities. It is, relatively speaking, easier to emulate best practice when one is already close to the frontier and has solid foundations to build on. A much greater challenge is to build a successful innovation system in a region with longstanding structural weaknesses, focused on a modest-size university with a limited number of research strengths. The first prescription is to broaden the research base at the same time as the commercial interactions are developed. Poor regions need outside help to do this, and it would be difficult to imagine the Technium-ILS-IAT package happening (to the extent that it has) without either EU Structural Funds or committed support from central government. The second design requirement is to mix SME spin-outs with MNE spin-ins and to facilitate interaction between the two. The third is to use funding streams to provide complementary 'soft' support such as advice on intellectual property. The 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 
